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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of allocation rules on the stability of mass tort class actions.
I analyze a two-stage model in which a defendant faces multiple plainti¤s with heterogeneous
damage claims. In stage 1, the plainti¤s play a noncooperative coalition formation game. In
stage 2, the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s are litigated or settled.
I examine how the method for allocating the class recovery interacts with other factors the
shape of the damage claims distribution, the scale benets of the class action, and the plainti¤s
probability of prevailing at trial and bargaining power in settlement negotiations to determine
the asymptotic stability of the global class. My results suggest criteria to attorneys and courts for
structuring and approving e¢ cient allocations plans in mass tort class actions and for evaluating
the requirements for class certication in mass tort cases. (JEL C72, K41)
Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Georgetown University, 600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, USA
(jct48@georgetown.edu). For helpful comments and feedback, I wish to thank Talia Bar, Ani Guerdjikova, Lewis
Kornhauser, Henrik Lando, and Charles Silver; workshop participants at Boston College, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity, Drexel University, Florida State University, George Mason University, Georgetown University, Northwestern
University, Roger Williams University, University at Bu¤alo, University of Illinois, University of Iowa, and the Uni-
versity of Virginia; and conference participants at the Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and
Economics and the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association.
1 Introduction
A class action allows one or more representative parties to sue or be sued on behalf of a class of
similarly situated persons. Rule 23(b)(3) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a case to proceed as a class action when, inter alia, "a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
In light of the general tradeo¤ between equity and e¢ ciency in matters of public policy and law
(Okun, 1975; Kaplow & Shavell, 2002), a class action that satises the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)
would appear to be socially desirable.
A distinguishing feature of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is that the putative class members
have the right to opt out of the class action and pursue their own interests (Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B)). Advocates of opt-out rights o¤er various deontological and instrumental arguments
in their favor.1 Notwithstanding the merits of these arguments, the right to opt out of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action creates the risk that the class will unravel in spite of the fact that a class
action is in societys best interests. This risk is acknowledged widely among class action scholars
(e.g., Abraham, 1987; Mullenix, 1991; Perino, 1997; Rosenberg, 2002; Campos, 2012), including by
opt-out rights advocates (e.g., Schuck, 1995; Rutherglen, 1996; Nagareda, 2003; Williams, 2015).
The risk that the class will unravel is thought to be particularly signicant in the case of a Rule
23(b)(3) mass tort class action (Co¤ee, 1987; Bone, 2003). Indeed, there is evidence that opt-out
rates are highest in mass tort cases (Eisenberg & Miller, 2004). A well-known example is the Fen-
Phen class action, "the unraveling of [which] was caused by multiple opportunities to opt out of the
settlement" (Campos, 2012, p. 1082).2 In recognition of this problem, several legal commentators
propose restricting or even abolishing opt-out rights in mass tort class actions (e.g., Mullenix, 1986;
Co¤ee, 1987; Rosenberg, 2003). Contrary to such proposals, however, Rule 23 continues to a¤ord
robust opt-out rights to members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.
A key reason why the class might unravel in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action is adverse
selection due to damage averaging (Co¤ee, 1987; Bone, 2003). Damaging averaging occurs when
the allocation rule governing the division of the net recovery of the class among its members assigns
class members with below-average (above-average) claims more (less) than their pro rata shares. If
the governing allocation rule engages in damage averaging, then, even if the per member expected
recovery in the class action exceeds the mean expected recovery from separate actions (which may
be the case if, for example, the class action enjoys economies of scale, superior prospects of prevailing
at trial, or enhanced bargaining power in settlement negotiations), the amount that one or more
putative class members with above-average claims can expect to recover by opting out may exceed
the amount that they can expect to recover by remaining in the class action.
1The deontological arguments usually emphasize the concept of plainti¤ autonomy and invoke the notion that
"everyone should have his own day in court" (Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999)). The instrumental
arguments usually emphasize the idea that the right to opt out serves as a mechanism to mitigate the principal-agent
problems inherent in class actions.
2Other examples of high prole mass tort class actions incude the Agent Organge, BP Deepwater Horizon, Dalkon
Shield, Exxon Valdez, aebestos, breast implants, heart valve, HIV-contaminated blood, and tobacco litigations.
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This paper examines how di¤erent allocation rules inuence the risk that the class will unravel
in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. I focus on three allocation rules: (1) equal sharing;
(2) pro rata by damage claims; and (3) pro rata by outside options (i.e., by expected claim values).
I consider these rules for two reasons. First and foremost, they run the gamut of damage averaging.
Rules 1 and 3 correspond to full damage averaging and no damage averaging, respectively, while
rule 2 involves partial damage averaging.3 Second, these rules are natural and obvious candidates
for "fair" allocation rules; as one commentator states in a closely related context, each rule has
"immediate, though perhaps naive, appeal" (Kornhauser, 1998, p. 1568).
I analyze a two-stage model of class action formation in which a single defendant faces multiple
plainti¤s with heterogeneous damage claims. A global class action is certied at the outset. In stage
1, the plainti¤s play a coalition formation game in which each plainti¤ simultaneously announces
whether it will remain in the class or opt out. Stage 1 is modeled as a noncooperative game in
partition function form (e.g., Bloch, 2003; Yi, 2003). The global class is stable if the strategy prole
in which all plainti¤s remain in the class constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In stage
2, the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s are resolved via litigation or
settlement. Stage 2 is modeled in the divergent expectations tradition (e.g., Priest & Klein, 1984).
I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allocation rule. The global
class is asymptotically stable if the probability that it is stable converges to one as the number
of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large. I am interested in the asymptotic stability of the global
class because in the situation under consideration a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action the
number of plainti¤s presumably is large. This presumption follows not only from the fact that it is
a mass tort class action, but also because certication under Rule 23(b)(3) implies that the class
is "numerous" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
I show that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class will be
allocated pro rata in accordance with its membersoutside options (rule 3), but that it may not be
asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class will be shared equally (rule 1) or allocated pro
rata in accordance with the membersdamage claims (rule 2). For rules 1 and 2, I derive necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the global class. I also derive su¢ cient
conditions for the asymptotic stability and instability of the global class under rules 1 and 2. In
addition, I show that the asymptotic stability of the global class under rule 1 necessarily implies
the asymptotic stability of the global class under rule 2 but not vice versa.
I nd that a key determinant of the asymptotic stability of the global class under rule 1 is
the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims. Generally speaking, the global class
is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 if the expected damage claim is high and
the range of damage claims is narrow. If the claims distribution is unimodal and has a bounded
3Rule 2 involves partial damage averaging in my model because plainti¤s share a common probability of prevailing
at trial. It also would involve partial damage averaging if the probability of prevailing at trial were higher for plainti¤s
with above-average claims than for plainti¤s with below-average claims. However, if the probability of prevailing at
trial were lower for plainti¤s with above-average claims than for plainti¤s with below-average claims, then rule 2
would involve negative averaging whereby class members with below-average (above-average) claims would receive
less (more) than their pro rata shares.
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support, this implies that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1
when the distribution is negatively skewed. In addition, I nd that the magnitude of the scale
benets of the class action and the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial and bargaining power
in settlement negotiations are important determinants of the asymptotic stability of the global class
under rules 1 and 2. In particular, if the scale benets of a class action are high, the global class
is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤sbargaining power in
settlement negotiations is low. If, however, the scale benets of a class action are low, the global
class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤sprobability of
prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
My results demonstrate that selecting an allocation rule in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class
action generally involves a tradeo¤ between ex ante and ex post e¢ ciency. On the one hand,
the risk that the class will unravel due to adverse selection generally increases with the degree of
damage averaging in which the governing allocation rule engages. On the other hand, the cost of
implementing an allocation rule generally decreases as the degree of damage averaging in which it
engages increases (Co¤ee, 1987, 1998; Silver & Baker, 1998; Silver, 2000; Kishinevsky, 2017).4
More importantly, my results suggest when this tradeo¤ may be avoided e.g., when a class
action achieves large economies of scale and the plainti¤s have negatively skewed damage claims
over a narrow range and low bargaining power in settlement negotiations. In other words, my
results provide guidance regarding when and how allocation rules may be used to promote the
stability of the class in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. As a consequence, they also suggest
criteria for evaluating the requirements for class certication of mass tort cases and for approving
settlements of mass tort class actions. I elaborate these points in my concluding discussion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional back-
ground and related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the asymptotic
stability of the global class under each allocation rule. Section 5 illustrates the stability analysis
with numerical examples. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks. It discusses the implications of the
analysis and possible extensions of the model. Appendix A contains certain mathematical details.
Appendix B collects the proofs of all theorems.
2 Institutional Background and Related Literature
2.1 Introduction to Class Actions and Rule 23
The class action is a procedural device pursuant to which "[o]ne or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). In
general, the resolution of a class action binds all members of the class, including absent parties.
Thus, the class action forms an exception to the "principle of general application in Anglo-American
4As Silver (2000, p. 226) explains, "[i]t is more expensive to pay claimants amounts that roughly reect the size
and strength of their claims than it is to engage in damages averaging and pay them equal amounts, and it is more
expensive still to distribute payments that reect ne di¤erences between claimants."
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jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment . . . in a litigation in which he is not designated
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process" (Ortiz v. Fireboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999)).
The raison dêtre of the class action is e¢ ciency. Class actions can enhance e¢ ciency in several
ways. A class action can solve a collective action problem in a case in which individual actions
are not economically viable, thereby promoting optimal deterrence (Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); Macey &Miller 1991). When individual actions are economically
viable, a class action can achieve economies of scale, thereby reducing litigation costs and promoting
optimal investment in the litigation (Hay & Rosenberg, 2000), and promote uniformity in the law,
thereby avoiding the social costs associated with legal inconsistency.
The historical roots of the class action run deep. Litigation by representatives of a group seeking
to redress communal harms dates back medieval England (Yeazell, 1987). The modern ancestry
of the class action includes the bill of peace with multiple parties, which was developed in the
seventeenth century by the Court of Chancery in England (Chafee, 1932, 1950). In the United
States, the rst provision for class actions in federal courts, Rule 48 of the Federal Equity Rules,
was adopted in 1843. It permitted a representative suit when the parties on either side were too
numerous to be brought before the court without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays and
the representative parties were su¢ cient to represent the interests of the absent parties (42 U.S.
(1 How.) lvi (1843)). In 1912, Rule 48 was amended and restated as Rule 38. The revised rule
succinctly provided, "When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the whole" (226 U.S. 659 (1912)).
The existing class action device in the United States is Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Originally adopted in 1938, Rule 23 was substantially revised in 1966 and last amended
in 2009. In April 2018, the Supreme Court adopted new amendments to Rule 23 that take e¤ect
December 1, 2018 (if not disapproved by Congress). In what follows, I assume that Rule 23
incorporates the pending 2018 amendments.
As amended, Rule 23(a) enumerates four prerequisites to a class action: "(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." Commonly known as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation (Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997)), these prerequisites
echo the requirements of the former equity rules (Hensler et al., 2000).
Rule 23(b) species three situations in which a case that satises the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
may proceed as a class action. Rule 23(b)(1) permits a class action when separate actions would
create a risk that the party opposing the class would face inconsistent or varying adjudications
or that an adjudication as to one or more class members would prejudice the interests of other
class members. For example, Rule 23(b)(1) traditionally includes "limited fund" cases (Ortiz v.
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Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834 (1999)), in which "claims are made by numerous persons against
a fund insu¢ cient to satisfy all claims" (Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23). Rule 23(b)(2)
covers situations where the actions or omissions of the party opposing the class a¤ect the entire
class and injunctive or declaratory relief respecting the class as a whole is appropriate. A prime
example is a civil rights suit alleging unlawful discrimination against a class (Advisory Committees
Notes to Rule 23; Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997); Miller 1979).
Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained if common questions of law or fact
predominate over individual questions and if a class action is "superior to other available methods
for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy." According to its drafters, Rule 23(b)(3)
"encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, e¤ort, and
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacricing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results" (Advisory Committees Notes to
Rule 23). Rule 23(b)(3) is a catchall for class actions that do not t into the "pigeonholes" of Rule
23(b)(1) or (2) (Bronsteen & Fiss, 2003, p. 1434), but that "may nevertheless be convenient and
desirable depending upon the particular facts" (Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23).
Class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) are mandatory; class members
do not have a statutory right to exclude themselves from the class. By contrast, putative class
members have the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The rules require the court to
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion in accordance with the time and manner
restrictions set forth in the class action notice (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v)-(vi)). Those who
duly opt out are not bound by the outcome of the class action (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3)). When
deemed appropriate by the court, a class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a
separate class (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5)). In addition, a class action may be brought or maintained
with respect to particular issues only (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)).
Any settlement of a certied class action must be approved by the court (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)).
In order for the settlement to be binding, the court must nd that the settlement is "fair, reasonable,
and adequate" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)). In making this nding, the court must consider, inter
alia, whether "the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account . . . the e¤ectiveness
of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-
member claims" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(c)(ii)), and whether the settlement "treats class members
equitably relative to each other" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D)). The courts review of a settlement
is distinct from and in addition to the courts certication inquiry, including with respect to the
adequacy requirement and, in the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the superiority requirement
(Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-22 (1997); Nagareda 2002). If the class
action was previously certied under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement
unless it a¤ords class members a new opportunity to opt out (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4)).
When class actions are certied in mass tort cases, they usually are certied under Rule 23(b)(3)
(Weinstein, 1995). The use of class actions to resolve mass tort cases, however, is controversial
(Schuck, 1995; Hensler, 2001). Moreover, judicial attitudes towards mass tort class actions have
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ebbed and owed since the 1966 overhaul of Rule 23 (Co¤ee, 1995; Perino, 1997; Klono¤, 2013,
2017).5 Still, mass tort class actions remain relevant today (Klono¤, 2017; Miller, 2018).
2.2 Relation to the Literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature within law, economics, and their intersection.
Within law, this paper contributes to the vast literature on class actions. In particular, it adds to
the legal scholarship that discusses allocations in class actions, including Morawetz (1993), Baker
& Silver (1997), Co¤ee (1998), Silver & Baker (1998), Dana (2006), Edelman, Nagareda, & Silver
(2006), Macey & Miller (2009), Rave (2013), Kishinevsky (2017), and Ratner (2017).
This paper closely relates and directly contributes to the small literature on the economics of
class actions. This literature includes Kornhauser (1983, 1998), Che (1996), Perino (1997), Marceau
& Mongrain (2003), and De¤ains & Langlais (2011, 2012).
Kornhauser (1983, 1998) and Perino (1997) model the formation of a class action as a cooperative
game in characteristic function form. Kornhauser considers an "allocation of common costs" game
and adopts the core of the game as the standard for a "fair" allocation. While certain of his results
are comparable to the results in this paper, Kornhauser focuses on how di¤erent court procedures
for approving settlements (intervention rules, voting rules, and attorney compensation schemes)
inuence whether the class attorney and the defendant will propose a fair allocation. Perino uses
a simple, three-player game to construct a series of examples that illustrate how the concept of
core stability can elucidate several academic theories and real-world phenomena pertaining to class
actions and opt-out rights. Although he does not develop a general model, Perino demonstrates
the usefulness of core theory for the analysis of class action dynamics.
Che (1996), Marceau & Mongrain (2003), and De¤ains & Langlais (2011, 2012) study the equi-
librium formation of class actions using di¤erent noncooperative games. Che examines the adverse
selection hypothesis in a model that features a single defendant, two types of plainti¤s (small stakes
and large stakes), and full damaging averaging. He focuses on the role of asymmetric information,
considering two cases: when the defendant has complete information about the plainti¤sclaims
and when the plainti¤sclaims are private information. In both cases he nds equilibria in which
the class partially or fully unravels, although he nds that pure adverse selection arises only in the
case of complete information. Ches model is closely related to my model and his results in the case
complete information are comparable to my results on class stability under equal sharing. Marceau
& Mongrain analyze a waiting game among multiple plainti¤s with heterogenous damage claims
and examine how the degree of damage averaging inuences which plainti¤ will assume the role of
class representative and initiate the class action. They nd that if there is full damage averaging,
5The advisory committees notes accompanying the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 state that a "mass accident
resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood
that signicant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, a¤ecting
the individuals in di¤erent ways" (Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23). However, courts often disregard this
comment (Kane, 2018, sec. 1783) and ocassionally expressly repudiate it (e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d
709, 729-38 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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the class representative will be the plainti¤ with the lowest damage claim, while if there is less than
full damage averaging, other plainti¤s may initiate the class action. De¤ains & Langlais consider a
sequential entry game between two plainti¤s (high stakes and low stakes) that have been injured by
the same defendant. They focus on the consequences of information externalities and information
sharing for the formation of a class action, though in an extension of their model they prove one
result on damage averaging that is comparable to results in this paper.
In addition, this paper draws on the litigation and settlement literature within law and eco-
nomics, including, most notably, Landes (1971), Posner (1973), Gould (1973), Shavell (1982), Priest
& Klein (1984), and Hylton (2006). This paper also draws on the literature within economics and
game theory on noncooperative games of coalition formation. Surveys of this literature are provided
by Konishi, Le Breton, & Weber (1997), Bloch (1997, 2003), and Yi (2003).
3 Two-Stage Model of Class Action Formation
Consider a mass tort case with n plainti¤s and one defendant. Let N denote the set of all plainti¤s
and i denote an arbitrary plainti¤ in N . All parties are risk neutral expected wealth maximizers.
Each plainti¤ i 2 N has a damage claim i against the defendant. Each plainti¤s damage claim
is its private knowledge. However, it is common knowledge that the plainti¤sdamage claims are
independent and identically distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F and a
probability density function f that is strictly positive on its support set [; ], where 0 <  <  <1.
The defendants assets are available and su¢ cient to satisfy the damage claims of all plainti¤s.
At the outset, a class action on behalf of all plainti¤s is certied under Rule 23(b)(3). In stage
1, each plainti¤ simultaneously announces whether it will remain in the class action or opt out
pursuant to Rule 23(c). Assuming simultaneous announcements captures the idea that a plainti¤
does not know the announcements of the other plainti¤s when it makes its announcement. Let
A  N denote the subset of plainti¤s that remain in the class action and let N=A denote the subset
of plainti¤s that opt out. I refer to A as the class, to each plainti¤ i 2 A as a class member, and
to each plainti¤ i 2 NnA as an opt-out plainti¤ . The number of class members is denoted by jAj
and I refer to jAj as the class size.
I assume that each plainti¤s announcement is binding (i.e., no class member may opt out and
no opt-out plainti¤ may rejoin the class) and that each opt-out plainti¤ must pursue its claim
individually (e.g., no other class actions are maintained on behalf of opt-out plainti¤s and no opt-
out plainti¤s maintain joinder actions under Rule 20).6 Accordingly, the plainti¤sannouncements
induce a partition 
A of N , where 
A =
n
A; (i)i2NnA
o
. I refer to 
A as the class structure and to
each ! 2 
A as a stage 2 plainti¤ . For the sake of brevity, I often refer to a stage 2 plainti¤ simply
as a plainti¤.
6Rule 20 provides, in pertinent part: "All persons may join in one action as plainti¤s if they assert any right to
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action"
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)).
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In stage 2, the defendant and each plainti¤ ! 2 
A resolve their dispute via litigation or
settlement. I assume that the classdamage claim equals the expected damage claim multiplied by
the class size: A = E []  jAj. In addition, I assume that there are no externalities or spillovers
across plainti¤s. In particular, I assume that the class action and any individual actions by opt-out
plainti¤s are resolved simultaneously and that all claims have the same priority in bankruptcy.
Because the plainti¤sexpected payo¤s in stage 1 are functions of their expected recoveries in
stage 2, I proceed in reverse chronological order and begin with stage 2.
3.1 Stage 2: Dispute Resolution
Plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle rather than litigate their dispute if a settlement range exists
i.e., if plainti¤ !s reservation price (its minimum settlement demand) is less than or equal to the
defendants reservation price (its maximum settlement o¤er):
P!!   C!  Q!! +K!; (1)
where (i) P! and Q! denote the respective estimates by plainti¤ ! and the defendant of the
probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial and (ii) C! > 0 and K! > 0 denote the respective
litigation costs of plainti¤ ! and the defendant.7 If no settlement range exists the parties litigate.
Condition (1) implicitly assumes that if the parties litigate and plainti¤ ! prevails at trial the
defendant is liable to plainti¤ ! for its damage claim !, that the parties bear their own litigation
costs,8 and that settlement costs are zero.9 By (1), Q! > P! is a su¢ cient (but not necessary)
condition for settlement and P! > Q! is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for litigation.
The parties estimate the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial with error. In par-
ticular, I assume that the partiesestimates are given by
P! = W! + !; (2)
Q! = W! + !; (3)
where (i) W! is the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial and (ii) ! and ! represent
the respective prediction errors of plainti¤ ! and the defendant. I assume that ! and ! are
independently realized at the beginning of stage 2 and that each is uniformly distributed on the
interval [maxf W!;W!   1g;minfW!; 1  W!g]. The latter assumption ensures that the parties
estimates of the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial are between zero and one (P! 2
[0; 1] and Q! 2 [0; 1]) and are correct in expectation (E [P!] = E [Q!] = W!). This assumption
also implies that the variance of the partiesprediction errors is zero at W! = 0 and W! = 1, when
7Condition (1) is a so-called Landes-Posner-Gould condition (Landes, 1971; Posner, 1973; Gould, 1973).
8This reects the American rule (see, e.g., Shavell, 1982; Hylton, 1993)
9This is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Shavell, 1982; Hylton, 1993, 2006). Alternatively, we
could relax this assumption and then assume that litigation costs exceed settlement costs, in which case C! and K!
would denote the excess of litigation costs over settlement costs for plainti¤ ! and the defendant, respectively.
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the outcome of a trial is certain, and achieves its maximum at W! = 12 , when the outcome of a
trial is most uncertain (cf. Priest & Klein, 1984; Hylton, 2006).
Given (2) and (3), we can restate condition (1) as follows: plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle
rather than litigate their dispute if
!   ! 
C! +K!
!
: (4)
It follows that the probability that plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle is
! = F(W!)

C! +K!
!

; (5)
where F(W!) is the cumulative distribution function of (W!) = !   !.10 Conversely, the
probability that plainti¤ ! and the defendant litigate is 1  !.
We can infer from (4) and (5) how various factors generate litigation in the model. Condition
(4) implies that litigation may result from "overoptimism" on the part of both parties (i.e., ! > 0
and ! < 0) (cf. Shavell, 1982; Hylton, 2006). Equation (5) implies that the probability that the
parties litigate is weakly decreasing in joint litigation costs, C! +K!, and weakly increasing in the
litigation stakes, ! (cf. Posner, 1973; Hylton, 2006). This is because F! is nondecreasing. In
addition, equation (5) implies that the probability of litigation is weakly greater the more uncertain
is the outcome of a trial (cf. Priest & Klein, 1984; Hylton, 2006). This is because F(W!) rst-order
stochastically dominates F(W) on [0; 1] if
W!   12  < W   12 .
3.2 Stage 1: Class Formation Game
The formation of the class is modeled as a noncooperative, simultaneous move, single coalition
formation game  , where: (i) the set of players is the set of all plainti¤s, N ; (ii) the set of actions
available to each plainti¤ is fIn;Outg; and (iii) payo¤s are described by a per-member partition
function V = R, where (a)  is a partition function that assigns to each class structure 
A a
vector  2 Rj
Aj which species the expected recovery ! of each plainti¤ ! 2 
A in stage 2 and
(b) R is an allocation rule that maps each stage 2 expected recovery prole  into a vector v 2 Rn
which species the expected payo¤ vi of each plainti¤ i 2 N at stage 1.
3.2.1 Expected Recovery
If the parties litigate, plainti¤ ! expects to recover
L! = P!!   C!:
If the parties settle, plainti¤ ! expects to recover its minimum settlement demand, P!! C!, plus
its bargained-for share of the joint surplus from settlement, ! = (Q!! +K!)   (P!!   C!).
10The distribution of (W!) is derived in appendix A.
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I assume plainti¤ ! expects Nash bargaining over the surplus !. Accordingly, if ! 2 [0; 1]
represents plainti¤ !s bargaining power, plainti¤ ! expects to recover
S! = (P!!   C!) + !!
= ! (Q!! +K!) + (1  !) (P!!   C!) :
Hence, plainti¤ !s expected recovery in stage 2 is
! = !
S
! + (1  !)L!
= !! (Q!! +K!) + (1  !!) (P!!   C!) :
Of course, this assumes plainti¤ ! has correct expectations with regard to its bargaining power !
and the probability of settlement !. This seems reasonable insofar as the plainti¤ (or its lawyer)
has experience with or data on similar cases (cf. Priest & Klein, 1984).
3.2.2 Expected Payo¤s
Under any allocation rule, the expected payo¤ of each opt-out plainti¤ i 2 NnA under class
structure 
A is simply the expected value at stage 1 of its expected recovery in stage 2. However,
the expected payo¤ of each class member i 2 A under class structure 
A depends on the allocation
rule R. I consider the following three allocation rules, each of which is dened in terms of the
vector of expected payo¤s v it induces:
(R1) Equal sharing : vi(
A) =
(
1
jAjE [A] for i 2 A
E [i] for i 2 NnA
;
(R2) Pro rata by damage claims: vi(
A) =
(
i
A
E [A] for i 2 A
E [i] for i 2 NnA
;
(R3) Pro rata by outside options: vi(
A) =
(
E[i]P
j2A E[j ]
E [A] for i 2 A
E [i] for i 2 NnA
:
3.2.3 Notion of Stability
The class structure 
A is stable if, given the announcements of the other plainti¤s, no class mem-
ber could increase its expected payo¤ by opting out of the class and no opt-out plainti¤ could
increase its expected payo¤ by remaining in the class. Formally, for a class member i 2 A, let

A i denote the alternative class structure in which plainti¤ i opts out of the class action, i.e.,

A i =
n
Anfig; i; (j)j2NnA
o
. I refer to vi(
A i) as class member is outside option. Similarly, for an
opt-out plainti¤ i 2 NnA, let 
A+i denote the alternative class structure in which plainti¤ i remains
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the class action, i.e., 
A+i =
n
A [ fig; (j)j2NnA[fig
o
. I refer to vi(
A+i) as opt-out plainti¤ is inside
option. The class structure 
A is internally stable if for each class member i 2 A its expected
payo¤ under 
A is greater than its outside option:
vi(

A)  vi(
A i) for all i 2 A:
The class structure 
A is externally stable if for each opt-out plainti¤ i 2 NnA its expected payo¤
under 
A is greater than or equal to its inside option:
vi(

A)  vi(
A+i) for all i 2 NnA:
The class structure 
A is stable if it is both internally stable and externally stable. Note that this
notion of stability corresponds to the concept of pure strategy Nash equilibrium: the class structure

A is stable if and only if the announcement prole that induces 
A constitutes a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of game  . This notion of stability was introduced by dAspremont et al. (1983).
My formulation closely follows Weikard (2009).
For purposes of this paper, I focus on the stability of the class structure 
N , which consists of
the class of all plainti¤s, A = N , and no opt-out plainti¤s. I refer to 
N as the global class. Note
that the global class is stable provided it is internally stable; it is trivially externally stable because
there are no opt-out plainti¤s. I focus on the global class for two reasons. First, it is the default
class structure. The global class is formed by operation of law upon certication of a class action
under Rule 23. Second, it presumably is the e¢ cient class structure. Class certication under Rule
23(b)(3) on behalf of all plainti¤s implies that "a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)) and that it is
inappropriate to divide the global class into subclasses (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5)).
In particular, I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class.
Denition 1 The global class is asymptotically stable if and only if for every plainti¤ i 2 N ,
plim
n!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0.
According to denition 1, the global class is asymptotically stable if and only if the probability
that it is (internally) stable converges to one as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large.11
As noted above, I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class because the situation under
consideration is a mass tort class action in which the class is "numerous" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
3.2.4 Additional Assumptions
Symmetry. On the basis that class certication under Rule 23(b)(3) implies that the plainti¤s are
"similarly situated" with respect to their factual and legal claims against the defendant (Advisory
11To see this, note that plim
n!1
 
vi(

A)  vi(
A i)

= d  0 if and only if for all e > 0,
lim
n!1
Pr(
 vi(
A)  vi(
A i)  d < e) = 1.
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Committees Notes to Rule 23), I assume that: (i) each individual plainti¤ has the same litigation
costs and the defendants litigation costs are the same with respect to each individual plainti¤:
C! = C and K! = K for all ! 6= A;
CA = C and KA = K for jAj = 1;
(ii) each plainti¤ has the same probability that it would prevail at trial:
W! = W for all ! 2 
A;
and (iii) each plainti¤ has the same bargaining power in settlement negotiations:
w =  for all ! 2 
A:
Economies of scale. Class certication under Rule 23(b)(3) also implies that "a class action
would achieve economies of time, e¤ort, and expense" (Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23).
Accordingly, I assume that although litigation costs are increasing in class size, per-plainti¤ litiga-
tion costs are weakly decreasing in class size, but always positive:
CA  C and KA  K for jAj > 1; (6)
1
jAjCA 
1
jA0jCA0 and
1
jAjKA 
1
jA0jKA0 for all A;A
0  N , jAj > A0 ; (7)
1
jAjCA ! c > 0 and
1
jAjKA ! k > 0 as jAj ! 1: (8)
Because the class enjoys neither a higher probability of prevailing at trial nor enhanced bargaining
power in settlement negotiations, these scale benets provide the key incentive in the model for
plainti¤s to remain in the class action. Indeed, the per-plainti¤ net recovery is weakly increasing
in class size and achieves its maximum when the class includes all plainti¤s (i.e., when A = N).
Viability of litigation. I restrict attention to mass tort cases in which litigation is objectively
viable for each plainti¤:
W   C  0:
Accordingly, the model does not pertain to mass torts for which a class action is socially desirable
because it solves a collective action problem. Rather, it pertains to mass torts for which a class
action is socially desirable because it achieves economies of scale. Similarly, I assume that litigation
against each plainti¤ is objectively viable for the defendant:
W  K  0:
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4 Asymptotic Stability of the Global Class
This section examines the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allocation rule. I
show that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class is allocated
pro rata in accordance with the membersoutside options (R3), but that the global class is not
necessarily asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class is shared equally by the members
(R1) or allocated pro rata in accordance with their damage claims (R2). For R1 and R2, I derive
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the global class as well as su¢ cient
conditions for the asymptotic stability and instability of the global class. In addition, I show that
the asymptotic stability of the global class under R1 necessarily implies the asymptotic stability of
the global class under and R2 but not vice versa.
Before proceeding with the analysis by allocation rule, I note the following prefatory results,
which hold for every allocation rule.
Lemma 1 Take any allocation rule.
(a) Take any A  N . Then for all i 2 NnA, i  A if and only if i >

C+K
1
jAj (CA+KA)

1
jAjA

.
(b) Dene (1) = min
1in
i and (1) = F(W )

C+K
(1)

. Then (1)  N .
(c) Dene (n) = max
1in
i and (n) = F(W )

C+K
(n)

. Then:
(i) plim
n!1
(n) = ;
(ii) plim
n!1

(n)   N

 0 if  >

C+K
c+k

E []; and
(iii) plim
n!1

(n)   N

 0 if  <

C+K
c+k

E [].
Lemma 1(a) says that an opt-out plainti¤ is less likely to settle, and therefore more likely to
litigate, than the class if and only if its damage claim exceeds the average damage claim of the
class members by a factor greater than the scale benet of the class action. Lemma 1(b) says that
the member of the global class with the lowest damage claim would be more likely to settle, and
therefore less likely to litigate, than the global class were that member to opt out. Lemma 1(c)(i)
says that, as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large, the probability that at least one
plainti¤ has the maximum damage claim converges to one. Lemmas 1(c)(ii) and (iii) say that, as
the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large, the probability that the member of the global
class with the highest damage claim would be less (more) likely to settle, and therefore more (less)
likely to litigate, than the global class were that member to opt out converges to one, provided
that the factor by which the maximum damage claim exceeds the expected damage claim is greater
(less) than the maximum scale benet of a class action.
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4.1 Equal Sharing (R1)
The following proposition sets forth a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the asymptotic stability
of the global class under equal sharing.
Proposition 1 Suppose the allocation rule is R1. Then the global class is asymptotically stable if
and only if
  E [] + 1; (9)
where 1 =
1
W

(C   c) + 
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
.
The following results follow from proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose the allocation rule is R1. Then:
(a) The global class is not asymptotically stable if E [] <    .
(b) If E [] >    , then:
(i) the global class is asymptotically stable if C+Kc+k is su¢ ciently high and  is su¢ ciently
low; and
(ii) the global class is not asymptotically stable if C+Kc+k is su¢ ciently low and either W is
su¢ ciently high or  is su¢ ciently low.
Corollary 1(a) implies that a key determinant of the asymptotic stability of the global class
under R1 is the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims. It suggests that the
global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R1 if the expected damage claim
is high and the range of damage claims is narrow. If the distribution of the plainti¤s damage
claims is unimodal, corollary 1(a) implies that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically
stable under R1 if the distribution is negatively skewed. Corollary 1(b) suggests that the global
class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R1 if the scale benets of a class action are
high and the plainti¤sbargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. If the scale benets
of a class action are low, however, corollary 1(b) suggests that the global class is less likely to be
asymptotically stable under R1 if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high or their
bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
4.2 Pro Rata by Damage Claims (R2)
The following proposition sets forth a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the asymptotic stability
of the global class if the net recovery of the class is allocated pro rata in accordance with the
membersdamage claims.
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Proposition 2 Suppose the allocation rule is R2. Then the global class is asymptotically stable if
and only if
  C
c
E [] + 2; (10)
where 2 =

c
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
.
The following results follow from proposition 2.
Corollary 2 Suppose the allocation rule is R2. Then:
(a) The global class is asymptotically stable if C+Kc+k is su¢ ciently high and  is su¢ ciently low; in
particular, if C+Kc+k >

E[] and   c CE[]F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+k) E[]F(W )

C+K


(C+K)
.
(b) The global class is asymptotically stable if


E[]   Kc
  
1 + kc
 1  C+Kc+k  E[] .
(c) The global class is not asymptotically stable if C+Kc+k is su¢ ciently low and either
(i) W is su¢ ciently high and  < C or (ii)  is su¢ ciently low.
The results of corollaries 2(a) and (c) closely resemble those of corollaries 1(b)(i) and (ii). They
suggest that if the scale benets of a class action are high, the global class is more likely to be
asymptotically stable under R2 if the plainti¤s bargaining power in settlement negotiations is
low, and that if the scale benets of a class action are low, the global class is less likely to be
asymptotically stable under R2 if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high or their
bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. Corollary 2(b) suggests that, irrespective of
the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial or bargaining power in settlement negotiations, the
global class is likely to be asymptotically stable under R2 if the scale benets of a class action are
close to (but do not exceed) the ratio of the maximum damage claim to the expected damage claim.
It is interesting to note how the results of lemma 1 inform certain results of corollaries 1 and
2. First, corollaries 1(b)(i) and 2(a) indicate that even if the scale benets of a class action are
high, damage averaging may lead the global class to unravel if the plainti¤sbargaining power in
settlement negotiations is high. Lemma 1(c) suggests why: when the scale benets of a class action
are high, the probability of reaching a settlement (and realizing the benets of their high bargaining
power) is greater for opt-plainti¤s than it is for the global class. Second, corollaries 1(b)(ii) and
2(c) indicate that when the scale benets of a class action are low, damage averaging may lead the
global class to unravel if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high. Again lemma 1(c)
suggests why: when the scale benets of a class action are low, the probability of litigation (and
realizing the benets of their high probability of prevailing at trial) is greater for opt-out plainti¤s
than it is for the global class.
The following proposition states that asymptotic stability of the global class under R1 neces-
sarily implies asymptotic stability of the global class under R2 but not vice versa.
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Proposition 3 If the global class is asymptotically stable under R1, then the global class is asymp-
totically stable under R2. If the global class is asymptotically stable under R2, however, the global
class may or may not be asymptotically stable under R1.
4.3 Pro Rata by Outside Options (R3)
The following proposition states that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of
the class is allocated to the members pro rata in accordance with their outside options.
Proposition 4 Suppose the allocation rule is R3. Then the global class is asymptotically stable.
5 Numerical Illustrations
This section illustrates the stability results of the previous section with ve numerical examples.
In the examples, I assume that i =
 
   Xi + , where Xi iid Beta(; ). That is, I assume that
i follows a Beta distribution on the interval

; 

with shape parameters  and . Under this
assumption, the expected damage claim is E[] = (   )


+

+ .
Table 1 summarizes the ve examples. In each example, the probability that the plainti¤s would
prevail at trial is high (W = 0:88) and the plainti¤sbargaining power is settlement negotiations
is low ( = 0:23). The other case variables are varied across the examples to illustrate how the
asymptotic stability of the global class depends on the characteristics of the case.
Table 1: Summary of Five Examples
Example Number
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
 8 30 30 8 30
 40 40 40 40 40
 6 6 6 6 15
 15 15 15 15 6
W 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
C+K
c+k 1.1 1.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
Example 1 This example illustrates a classic case of asymptotic instability: the plainti¤sdamage
claims are positively skewed over a wide range and the scale benets of a class action are low. The
global class is asymptotically stable neither if the net recovery of the class is allocated equally
among the members nor if it is allocated pro rata in accordance with the membersdamage claims.
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R1 : Not asymptotically stable
E [] = 17 < 32 =    
R2 : Not asymptotically stable
C+K
c+k = 1:1 < 2:4 =

E[] & W = 0:88 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3
4
Density of 
Example 2 Like example 1, this example has positively skewed damage claims and low scale
benets. The key di¤erence is that the range of damage claims is narrow. This example illustrates
that, even with a narrow range of damage claims, low scale benets can lead to the asymptotic
instability of the global class under R1 and R2.
R1 : Not asymptotically stable
E [] = 33 > 10 =    
C+K
c+k = 1:1 < 1:2 =

E[] & W = 0:88
R2 : Not asymptotically stable
C+K
c+k = 1:1 < 1:2 =

E[] & W = 0:88
30 32 34 36 38 40
0
1
2
3
4
Density of 
Example 3 Like example 2, this example has positively skewed but narrowly ranging damage
claims. The key di¤erence is that the scale benets of a class action are high, which reverses the
result. Now the global class is asymptotically stable under both R1 and R2.
R1 : Asymptotically stable
E [] = 33 > 10 =    
C+K
c+k = 3:0 > 1:2 =

E[] &  = 0:23
R2 : Asymptotically stable
C+K
c+k = 3:0 > 1:2 =

E[] &  = 0:23
30 32 34 36 38 40
0
1
2
3
4
Density of 
Example 4 Like example 1, this example has positively skewed and widely ranging damage claims.
The key di¤erence is that, like example 3, the scale benets of a class action are high. Here the class
is asymptotically stable under R2 but not under R1, illustrating that pivotal role that the shape
of the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims plays in determining the asymptotic stability of
the global class under equal sharing.
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R1 : Not asymptotically stable
E [] = 17 < 32 =    
R2 : Asymptotically stable
C+K
c+k = 3:0 > 2:4 =

E[] &  = 0:23 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3
4
Density of 
Example 5 This example illustrates a classic case of asymptotic stability: the plainti¤sdamage
claims are negatively skewed over a narrow range and the scale benets of a class action are high.
The global class is asymptotically stable whether the net recovery of the class is allocated equally
among the members or pro rata in accordance with the membersdamage claims. It is noteworthy
that here, because of the favorable shape of the claims distribution, even more modest scale benets
(e.g., half the assumed scale benets) would lead to the asymptotic stability of the global class under
both allocation rules.
R1 : Asymptotically stable
E [] = 37 > 10 =    
C+K
c+k = 3:0 > 1:1 =

E[] &  = 0:23
R2 : Asymptotically stable
C+K
c+k = 3:0 > 1:1 =

E[] &  = 0:23
30 32 34 36 38 40
0
1
2
3
4
Density of 
6 Concluding Remarks
I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action
under three rules for allocating the net recovery of the class among its members: (1) equal sharing;
(2) pro rata by damage claims; and (3) pro rata by outside options. I analyze a two-stage model
of class action formation in which a single defendant faces multiple plainti¤s with heterogeneous
damage claims. A global class action is certied at the outset. In stage 1, the formation of the class
is modeled as a noncooperative, simultaneous move, single coalition formation game in partition
function form. In stage 2, the resolution via litigation or settlement of the class action and any
individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s is modeled in the divergent expectations tradition.
I show that the global class is asymptotically stable under rule 3, but may not be asymptotically
stable under rules 1 and 2. The shape of the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims proves
to be a key determinant of class stability under rule 1. In particular, I nd that the global class is
more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 if the expected damage claim is high and the
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range of damage claims is narrow, which suggests that if the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage
claims is unimodal then the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 if
the distribution is negatively skewed. I also nd that the scale benets of the class action and the
plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial and their bargaining power in settlement negotiations
are important determinants of class stability. Under rules 1 and 2, the global class is more likely to
be asymptotically stable when the scale benets of a class action are high and when the plainti¤s
bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. When the scale benets of a class action are
low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤s
probability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
My results highlight a general tradeo¤ between ex ante and ex post e¢ ciency in selecting an
allocation rule in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. The tradeo¤ exists because the governing
allocation rules degree of damage averaging is positively related to the risk that the class will
unravel due to adverse selection but negatively related to the cost of implementing the allocation
rule. More importantly, however, the results also provide guidance regarding when this tradeo¤
may be avoided. For instance, the class is unlikely to unravel under partial damage averaging if
the class action achieves large economies of scale and the plainti¤s have low bargaining power in
settlement negotiations. If, in addition, the plainti¤s have negatively skewed damage claims over a
narrow range, then the class is unlikely to unravel even under full damage averaging.
This guidance, in turn, suggests criteria for evaluating the requirements for class certication
under Rule 23(b)(3). For example, if the plainti¤s damage claims are positively skewed over
a wide range then perhaps the court should not nd that "questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions a¤ecting only individual members" (Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3)). Similarly, if even a mild degree of damage averaging is likely to destabilize the
class then perhaps a class action is not "superior to other available methods for . . . e¢ ciently
adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)); cf. Shapiro 1998). My results also suggest
criteria evaluating the requirements for approving settlements under Rule 23(e). For instance, if the
proposed allocation plan is likely to destabilize the class then perhaps the court should not nd that
the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)) on the grounds that
the plan is not an e¤ective method of distributing relief to the class (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(c)(ii)).
Given that class actions scholars (and presumably courts) view the standards for judicial review of
class action settlements as "confused" and the numerous multifactor tests elaborated by courts as
"uncertain in scope, ambiguous in meaning and undened in weight" (Macey & Miller, 2009, pp.
167-168), this would appear to be a welcome contribution.12
There are several ways in which this paper could be extended. First, we could relax the assump-
tion that each opt-out plainti¤must pursue its claim individually. This would require redening the
stability concept from Nash equilibrium to strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) or coalition-
12Although the 2018 amendments to Rule 23 attempt to reduce this confusion by codifying the factors to be
considered by a court in reviewing a proposed settlement, unless and until the courts develop consistent interpretations
of these factors, they will remain "uncertain in scope, ambiguous in meaning and undened in weight" (Macey &
Miller, 2009, pp. 167-168).
19
proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, & Whinston, 1987).13 Although allowing plainti¤s to
form subcoalitions would make the analysis more general,14 it is not warranted in our setting. The
assumption that opt-out plainti¤ pursue their claims individually rests on two presumptions, each
of which is consistent with the premise that a global class action has been certied under Rule
23(b)(3). First, it presumes that no other court would certify a separate class action on behalf
of some or all opt-out plainti¤s, which is consistent with the fact that the court did not deem
it appropriate to divide the global class into subclasses (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5)). Second, it
presumes that search costs, personal jurisdiction requirements, or other transaction costs preclude
opt-out plainti¤s from maintaining one or more joinder actions under Rule 20, which is consistent
with the fact that the court determined that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
Second, we could relax the assumption that there are no externalities or spillovers across plain-
ti¤s. In particular, we could assume that the class action is resolved rst and that the existence or
size of the class a¤ects the expected recovery of opt-out plainti¤s.15 For example, we could assume
that the class action increases the probability that opt-out plainti¤s would prevail at trial due to
the potential for a factual or legal determination in favor of the class to be given preclusive e¤ect
against the defendant in a subsequent individual action by an opt-out plainti¤ under the doctrine of
nonmutual o¤ensive collateral estoppel.16 We also could relax the assumptions that the defendants
assets are su¢ cient to satisfy all damage claims and that all plainti¤s have the same priority in
bankruptcy. Instead, we could assume that the class action reduces the expected payo¤ for opt-out
plainti¤s due to the potential that, after the resolution of the class action, the defendant will not
have su¢ cient assets available to satisfy the damage claims of all opt-out plainti¤s.
Third, we could relax the symmetry assumptions. For instance, we could consider the possibility
that the class may enjoy enhanced bargaining as compared to individual plainti¤s (Silver, 2000;
Che, 2002). We also could imagine that a plainti¤s bargaining power may be a function of the
probability that it would prevail at trial.
Fourth, we could extend the model to give class members a second opportunity to opt out in
stage 2 in the event of a proposed settlement of the class action. Extending the model to include
a second opt-out would be consistent with the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, which, inter alia,
13 Informally, a strategy prole constitutes a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if it is immune to deviations by
coalitions. A strategy prole constitutes a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) if it is immune to credible
deviations by coalitions, i.e., coalitional deviations that themselves are immune to further deviations by subcoalitions.
For formal denitions of SNE and CPNE, see, e.g., Bloch (2003).
14One consequence of relaxing this assumption would be that proposition 3 would no longer hold; that is, allocating
the net recovery of the class to the members pro rata in accordance with their outside options would no longer ensure
the asymptotic stability of the global class.
15We also could consider making the timing of litigation/settlement endogenous, as in Marceau & Mongrain (2003).
16Under this assumption, if the class settles or losses at trial, the probability that an opt-out plainti¤ prevails
in a subsequent trial is W , but if the class prevails at trial, the probability that an opt-out plainti¤ prevails in a
subsequent trial is Y > W . Accordingly, the ex ante probability that an opt-out plaintif would prevail at trial is
W+ = [A + (1  A) (1 W )]W + [(1  A)W ]Y > W . The class action, therefore, increases the expected payo¤
of pursuing individual litigation against the defendant, which serves to undermine the stability of the global class.
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authorizes the court to refuse to approve a settlement in a previously certied Rule 23(b)(3) class
action unless it a¤ords class members a new opportunity to opt out (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4)).
Lastly, we could generalize the model to cover all possible allocations rules (i.e., all degrees of
damage averaging). This would entail modeling the recovery to a plainti¤ as a linear combination
of his own damage claim and the average damage claim of the class. We also could modify or
generalize the model to apply to or encompass other nonmandatory claim aggregation mechanisms.
Appendix A: Distribution of (W )
Let ";   Uniform(a; b) and dene  = "   . It can be shown that the probability density
function of  is
f(z) =
8>><>>:
z+(b a)
(b a)2 a  b  z  0
(b a) z
(b a)2 0 < z  b  a
0 otherwise
:
It follows that the cumulative distribution function of  is
F(z) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 z < a  b
1
2

z+(b a)
(b a)
2
a  b  z  0
1  12

(b a) z
(b a)
2
0 < z  b  a
1 z  b  a
:
If W 2 [0; 12 ], then a =  W and b = W , which implies
f(W )(z) =
8><>:
z+2W
4W 2
 2W  z  0
2W z
4W 2
0 < z  2W
0 otherwise
and
F(W )(z) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 z <  2W
1
2
 
z+2W
2W
2  2W  z  0
1  12
 
2W z
2W
2
0 < z  2W
1 z > 2W
:
If W 2 [12 ; 1], then a = W   1 and b = 1 W , which implies
f(W )(z) =
8>><>>:
z+2(1 W )
4(1 W )2 2(W   1)  z  0
2(1 W ) z
4(1 W )2 0 < z  2(1 W )
0 otherwise
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and
F(W )(z) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 z < 2(W   1)
1
2

z+2(1 W )
2(1 W )
2
2(W   1)  z  0
1  12

2(1 W ) z
2(1 W )
2
0 < z  2(1 W )
1 z > 2(1 W )
:
Figures 1 and 2 depict f(W )(z) and F(W )(z) for W = 0:25, 0:5, and 0:75: As illustrated by gure
1, the density of (W ) is a symmetric tent (centered at z = 0) whose peak decreases to 1 as W
increases from 0 to 0:5 and then increases as W increases from 0:5 to 1. Similarly, as illustrated by
gure 2, the distribution of (W ) is a symmetric S (through F(W )(0) = 0:5) whose slope decreases
as W increases from 0 to 0:5 and then increases as W increases from 0:5 to 1. Furthermore, it can
be shown that F(W )(z) is continuous in W .
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Figure 1: Density of (W ) for W = 0:25; 0:5; and 0:75:
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W=0.5
Figure 2: Distribution of (W ) for W = 0:25, 0:5, and 0:75.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of lemma 1
(a) Follows immediately from the fact that F(W ) is nondecreasing.
(b) By assumptions (6)-(8) and because f is strictly positive on [; ], we have C+K1
n
(CN+KN )
 1 >
(1)
1
n
N
. Because F(W ) is nondecreasing, this implies (1) = F(W )

C+K
(1)

 F(W )

CN+KN
N

= N .
(c) (i) For any " > 0, Pr
 (n)     " = Pr  (n)   + " + Pr  (n)     ". Note that
Pr
 
(n)   + "

= 0 (because i   for all i 2 N). Note further that Pr
 
(n)     "

=
F(   ")
n
(see, e.g., Casella & Berger, 2002, thm. 5.4.4) and that F(   ") 2 [0; 1) (because
 is the upper bound of the support set of F). It follows that limn!1 Pr
 (n)     " =
limn!1

F(   e)
n
= 0.
(ii)-(iii) Because F(W ) is continuous, plimn!1 (n) = F(W )

C+K


and plimn!1 N =
F(W )

c+k
E[]

by the continuous mapping theorem. Because F(W ) is nondecreasing,  >

C+K
c+k

E []
implies plimn!1

(n)   N

= plimn!1 (n)   plimn!1 N  0 and  <

C+K
c+k

E [] implies
plimn!1

(n)   N

= plimn!1 (n)   plimn!1 N  0.
Proof of proposition 1
Under R1, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N ) =
1
n
E [N ]
= N

E [QN ]
N
n
+
KN
n

+ (1  N)

E [PN ]
N
n
  CN
n

=

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

:
In addition, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N
 i) = E [i]
= i (E [Qi] i +K) + (1  i) (E [Pi] i   Ci)
= (Wi   C) + i (C +K) :
Note plimn!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0 , plimn!1 vi(
N )   plimn!1 vi(
N i)  0. Without loss
of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as plainti¤ (n). That is, (n) =
max1in i. Because (n)  i and (n)  i for all i 2 N , we have plimn!1 v(n)(
N (n)) 
plimn!1 vi(
N i) for all i 2 N . It follows that plimn!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N ,
plimn!1 v(n)(
N )  plimn!1 v(n)(
N (n))  0.
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By assumption, Nn =
E[]n
n = E []. By assumption (8), plimn!1
CN
n = c and plimn!1
CN+KN
n =
c + k. By lemma 1(c), plimn!1 N = F(W )

c+k
E[]

, plimn!1 (n) = , and plimn!1 (n) =
F(W )

C+K


. Thus,
plim
n!1
v(n)(

N ) = plim
n!1

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

= (WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)
and
plim
n!1
v(n)(

N
 (n)) = plim
n!1
h 
W(n)   C

+ (n) (C +K)
i
=
 
W   C+ F(W )C +K


(C +K) :
Therefore, plimn!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N
, (WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)   W   C  F(W )C +K


(C +K)  0
,   E [] + 1W

(C   c) + 
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
:
Proof of corollary 1
(a) Assume E [] <    . It follows that  > E [] + 1 if 1  . By denition,
1 =
1
W

(C   c) + 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

:
Let
  = 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

:
If   < 0, then 1  CW   because W   C  0. If   > 0, then
1 
1
W

(C   c) +

(c+ k)  1
2
(C +K)

because  2 [0; 1] and F(W )(z) 2

1
2 ; 1

for z  0. It follows that
1 
1
2

C
W
+
K
W

 
because k  K, W   C  0, and W  K  0.
(b) (i) Assume E [] >    . Suppose  = 0. Then 1 = C cW . Recall that W   C  0. It
follows that 1     cW . Because C + K  2W, C+Kc+k ! 1 implies c + k ! 0, which in turn
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implies c! 0. Therefore, 1 !  from below as C+Kc+k !1. It follows that there exists x > 0 such
that C+Kc+k > x implies E [] +  > E [] + 1 > . Therefore, by continuity of 1, there exist  > 0
and x > 0 such that if  <  then C+Kc+k > x implies  < E [] + 1.
(ii) Suppose C+Kc+k = 1 and W = 1. Note that because 0 < c  C and 0 < k  K, C+Kc+k = 1
implies C = c. Note further that because F(1)

c+k
E[]

= F(1)

C+K


= 1, W = 1 implies
1 = ((C   c) +  [(c+ k)  (C +K)]). It follows that 1 = 0 when C+Kc+k = 1 and W = 1.
Therefore, by continuity of 1, there exist C > 1 and W < 1 such that if
C+K
c+k < C and W > W
then 1 <  E []. Now suppose C+Kc+k = 1 and  = 0. Because C+Kc+k = 1 implies C = c, it follows
that 1 = 0. Therefore, by continuity of 1, there exist C > 1 and  > 0 such that if
C+K
c+k < C
and  <  then 1 <    E [].
Proof of proposition 2
Under R2, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N ) =
i
N
E [N ] =
i
1
nN
1
n
E [N ]
=
i
1
nN

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

:
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as plainti¤ (n). By the
same logic set forth in the proof of proposition 1, it follows that plimn!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0
for all i 2 N , plimn!1 v(n)(
N )  plimn!1 v(n)(
N (n))  0. Now
plim
n!1
v(n)(

N ) = plim
n!1
 
(n)
1
nN

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n
!
:
=

E []

(WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

:
Therefore, plimn!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N
, 
E []

(WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

   W   C  F(W )C +K


(C +K)  0
,WE []  c+F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k) WE [] +CE [] E []F(W )

C +K


(C +K)  0
,   Cc E [] + c
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
:
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Proof of corollary 2
(a) Rewrite condition (10) as 2     Cc E []. This holds if


F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

 c   CE [] :
Now if C+Kc+k >

E[] , then F(W )

c+k
E[]

< F(W )

C+K


because F(W ) is nondecreasing. It
follows that C+Kc+k >

E[]
F(W )

c+k
E[]

F(W )

C+K

 , or F(W )  c+kE[] (c+ k) < E []F(W ) C+K  (C +K).
In addition, C+Kc+k >

E[] implies c < CE []. To see this, let
C+K
c+k = x. Then we have
C
c =
 
1 + kc

x   Kc < x < E[] . It follows that condition (10) holds if C+Kc+k > E[] and
  c CE[]
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+k) E[]F(W )

C+K


(C+K)
.
(b) Suppose C+Kc+k  E[] . Then F(W )

c+k
E[]

> F(W )

C+K


. It follows that C+Kc+k 

E[]
F(W )

c+k
E[]

F(W )

C+K

 , or F(W )  c+kE[] (c+ k)  E []F(W ) C+K  (C +K). Thus, C+Kc+k  E[]
implies 2  0. It follows that if C+Kc+k  E[] , then condition (10) holds if   Cc E []. Now
let C+Kc+k = x. Then
C
c =
 
1 + kc

x   Kc and we can rewrite the foregoing condition as   
1 + kc

x   Kc E []. This holds if x 


E[]   Kc
  
1 + kc
 1
. Therefore, condition (10) holds if

E[]   Kc
  
1 + kc
 1  C+Kc+k  E[] .
(c) (i) Suppose C+Kc+k = 1, W = 1, and C > . Let g =
C
c E [] + 2. We know from
the proof of corollary 1(b)(ii) that C+Kc+k = 1 implies C = c and that W = 1 implies 2 =

c

 (c+ k)  E [] (C +K). It follows that g = C     1  C E [] <  when C+Kc+k = 1, W = 1,
and C > . Therefore, by continuity of g, there exist C > 1 and W < 1 such that if C+Kc+k < C
and W > W and C >  then g < .
(ii) Let g = Cc E [] + 2. From part (i) above we know that C = c when
C+K
c+k = 1. It follows
that g = E [] <  when C+Kc+k = 1 and  = 0. Therefore, by continuity of g, there exist C > 1 and
 > 0 such that if C+Kc+k < C and  <  then g < .
Proof of proposition 3
Assume   E [] + 1. This implies 1 > 0 because E [] < . It follows that
1
W

(C   c) + 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

> 0;
which implies
F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k) > F(W )

C +K


(C +K)  (C   c) :
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Recall that W  C > 0,  < E [] < , and 0 < c  C. This implies W   c > WE []  c > 0. In
addition, note that F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k) > 0. It follows that

W   c
c

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

>

WE []  c
c

F(W )

C +K


(C +K)  (C   c)

;
which implies
WE []  c
c

(C   c) >

WE []  c
c

F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

 

W   c
c

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

:
It follows that
C   c
c

E [] >

C   c
W

+

E []
c
  1
W

F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

 


c
  1
W

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

;
which implies
C
c
E []  E [] > 1
W

(C   c) + 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

  
c

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

;
or
C
c
E []  E [] > 1   2:
Hence, E [] + 1 <
C
c E [] + 2. Therefore,   E [] + 1 implies  < Cc E [] + 2.
Proof of proposition 4
Under R3, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N ) =
E [i]Pn
j=1E [j ]
E [N ] =
E [i]Pn
j=1
1
nE [j ]
1
n
E [N ] :
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as plainti¤ (n). By the
same logic set forth in the proof of proposition 1, it follows that plimn!1
 
vi(

N )  vi(
N i)
  0
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for all i 2 N , plimn!1

v(n)(

N )  v(n)(
N (n))

 0. Now
plim
n!1

v(n)(

N )  v(n)


N (n)

= plim
n!1
 
E

(n)
Pn
j=1
1
nE [j ]
1
n
E [N ]  E

(n)
!
= plim
n!1
  
1
nE [N ]Pn
j=1
1
nE [j ]
  1
!
E

(n)
!
= plim
n!1
0@0@ W Nn   CNn + N

CN+KN
n

W Nn   C + 

1
n
Pn
j=1 j

(C +K)
  1
1AhW(n)   C + (n)(C +K)i
1A
=
0@ WE []  c+ F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)
WE []  C + 

plimn!1

1
n
Pn
j=1 j

(C +K)
  1
1AW   C + F(W )C +K


(C +K)

:
Note that
plim
n!1
0@ 1
n
nX
j=1
j
1A = plim
n!1

1
n
24plim
n!1
0@ nX
j=1
j
1A35 = plim
n!1

1
n
Z C+K

C+K

F(W ) (x) dx = 0
because
R C+K

C+K

F(W ) (x) dx 
R C+K

C+K

dx = C+K   C+K <1. In addition, note that
(WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k) WE []  C
because C  c > 0 and F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  0. Lastly, note that W   C > 0 because
W   C  0 and  < . Therefore, we have plimn!1

v(n)(

N )  v(n)(
N (n))

 0.
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